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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction in this matter is conferred upon this court pursuant to Utah 
Constitution, Article VIII, Section 3, 5 (1989 Supp.); Utah Code Annotated 
78-2a-3; and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an 
appeal from a Motion to Dismiss that was granted in the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah (lower court), the Honorable Leslie 
A. Lewis presiding. A ruling was entered on the 23rd of July, 1992 and 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered on August 14, 1992, 
along with an Order of Dismissal. Savage filed her Notice of Appeal on 
September 14,1992 and filed its Supersedeas Bond on September 14,1992. 
iv 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. When the Lower Court's Conclusions of Law are 
Challenged. 
The Lower Court's Conclusions of Law are accorded no particular 
deference on appeal, but are reviewed under a correctness standard. Cottam 
v. Heppner. 777 R2d 468, 471 (Utah 1989). Where the Lower Court makes a 
finding of fact supported by evidence in the record, but makes an incorrect 
conclusion of law therefrom, the Appellate Court can vacate that conclusion 
of law. I.F.G. Leasing Co. v. Gordon. 776 P.2d 607, 613 (Utah 1989). 
Is there a cause of action in the state of Utah against a workers 
compensation insurance carrier for lack of good faith and fair dealing in the 
processing of a claim of an injured worker. 
Is there a cause of action for an intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, by a workers compensation claimant against her employer's 
insurance company for failure to properly process a claim? 
Is there a cause of action for bad faith adjusting of a workers 
compensation claim against the workers compensation insurance carrier for 
punitive damages? 
1 
Is there a cause of action for a breach of a fiduciary relationship 
between the workers compensation insurance carrier and the workers 
compensation claimant? 
Are all material allegations of a Plaintiffs Complaint deemed true for 
purposes of a Motion to Dismiss and should they all be set forth in the 
Findings of Fact for the purposes of the Motion to Dismiss? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Section 31(a)-22-1004 of the Utah Code Annotated, as amended, states 
as follows: 
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 All workers compensation insurance policies shall contain a 
provision that employees may enforce, in their own names, the 
liability of the insurer." 
This section of the Utah Code allows for a lawsuit by the injured 
worker against workers compensation insurance carrier for any liability the 
carrier may have. It does not specify whether that lawsuit should sound in 
contract or tort. That is a significant issue before this Court at this time. 
o 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff/appellant Christine Savage ("Savage") brought an action in the 
lower court against Educators Insurance Company ("Educators") for breach 
of an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, violation of a fiduciary duty and punitive damages. 
Course of Proceedings 
Subsequent to the completion of discovery, Educators filed a Motion to 
Dismiss. It was heard on July 17,1992. All the counts of the Complaint were 
dismissed with prejudice and the Trial Court issued Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order. (See Appendix "A") 
Disposition in the Lower Court 
(See Course of Proceedings hereinabove.) 
RELEVANT FACTS 
1. Savage was employed by Jordan School District as a school bus 
driver (Paragraph 2, Complaint). Educators was the workers compensation 
insurance carrier for Jordan School District (Paragraph 3, Complaint). 
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2. On January 5, 1987, Savage had a head-on collision while 
driving her school bus when an automobile careened out of control in a winter 
storm and crashed into the school bus. Savage sustained serious personal 
injuries as a result of the accident (Paragraph 5, Complaint) 
3. Three physicians recommended Savage have a dorsal column 
stimulator implanted because after the disk operation she still had extreme 
suffering from her back (Paragraph 7 of the Complaint). 
4. The defendant, Educators, referred plaintiff to Dr. Gerald 
Moress for an Independent Medical Examination (hereinafter "IME"). In that 
exam Dr. Moress found that the dorsal column stimulator would not give her 
relief from her pain (Paragraph 8 of the Complaint). 
5. As a result of the opinion of Dr. Moress Educators informed 
Savage they would not pay for a dorsal column stimulator (Paragraph 9 of the 
Complaint). 
6. Approximately nine months later Educators Mutual reversed 
itself and agreed to pay for the dorsal column stimulator treatment. Savage 
had the dorsal column implant which greatly relieved her pain and suffering 
(Paragraph 10 of the Complaint). 
7. Savage filed a Complaint against Educators. (See Appendix MB") 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The main issue in this case is whether the state of Utah is going to 
recognize a cause of action for lack of good faith and fair dealing in a workers 
compensation claim made by the injured employee against a workers 
compensation insurance carrier. There has been no such case in the state of 
Utah to date. 
The reason this is a challenging question is that workers compensation 
insurance is peculiar because, unlike health insurance, there is not a specific 
policy issued for each insured employee. That is, a company or school district 
buys the master policy for all of their employees and it is only activated, for 
the benefit of the employee, when there is an injury or accident. At that point 
the claim is made by the employee to the employer. If there has been a work-
related injury or accident, then the workers compensation insurer of the 
employer processes the claim and pays the medical expenses, if any. 
There is a gap in Utah law when the workers compensation insurance 
carrier does not act in good faith in processing the injured worker's claim. 
There is no remedy at the Industrial Commission because their only charge is 
to determine there has been an injury and if it was work-related. If the 
company's workers compensation insurance carrier does not take care of the 
injured worker in most states, the courts have allowed the injured worker to 
sue the workers compensation carrier, either in contract or in tort, for bad 
faith adjusting of the claim. Other states have wrestled with this issue because 
of the fact there is no privity between the injured worker and the workers 
compensation insurance carrier, as in most other insurance contracts. 
There is no consistent legal analysis (on the issue of it being a tort or 
contract) in other state appellate court decisions. Part of the problem in Utah 
is that bad faith insurance adjusting has been held to sound in contract, rather 
than tort, even though the remedies are almost identical. 
In order to comply with the Utah State Constitution there must be a 
place where an injured worker (like Savage) can take her workers 
compensation insurance carrier of his employer to court for lack of good 
faith and fair dealing. In this case Savage languished in terrible pain for 
almost a year because Educators would not approve the implantation of the 
devise that would help relieve her terrible pain, which in fact did relieve her 
pain when it was implanted. 
There is no provision in the Workers Compensation Act allowing the 
Industrial Commission to order the workers compensation insurance carrier 
to do anything. They only have authority to order the employer to take care 
of the injuries of the injured worker. How it is done and what medical 
procedures are allowed and what are not allowed are largely left to the 
determination of the workers compensation insurance carrier. If they fail to 
perform there is little incentive on the part of the employer to order their 
workers compensation insurance carrier to allow certain medical procedures 
the carrier is unwilling to have performed. Such action on the part of the 
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employer could likely affect their future workers compensation insurance 
rates. Thus, the injured employee seems to be left without a remedy. 
This is not a typical third-party insurance claim. It is recognized that 
only the insured, under a typical insurance contract, can sue for lack of good 
faith and fair dealing against the insured's carrier. A third party that is 
damaged cannot sue the insurance carrier for the first party for good faith and 
fair dealing to the third party. The courts in other states who have similar 
Workers Compensation Acts as the state of Utah have therefore carved out an 
exception to this policy and allowed the injured worker to directly sue the 
workers compensation insurance carrier for lack of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
There has been no trial in this case, so factual allegations about the 
propriety of the use of Dr. Gerald Moress for an Independent Medical Exam 
have not been presented to the lower court and it would not seem that it would 
be appropriate for the Appellate Court to review this issue at this time without 
a record of these issues. 
The issue of punitive damages would depend on how this Court treats 
the issue of whether or not an injured worker can sue for lack of good faith 
and fair dealing against the employer's workers compensation insurance 
carrier, and if such a claim can be made in the state of Utah, does it sound in 
tort or contract? That is equally true of whether or not there is a fiduciary 
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relationship between the workers compensation insurance carrier and the 
injured worker, which appellant believes there is. 
The appellant asserts that the injured worker has a protected property 
interest in his employer's workers compensation insurance. If the insured 
worker has any rights to the insurance he would have a protected property 
rights. 
Finally, it is contended by the appellant that in a Motion to Dismiss the 
lower court must recite all the material allegations in the Plaintiffs Complaint 
and deem them to be true for the purposes of the motion. That was not done 
in this case by the lower court even after the plaintiff brought it to the court's 
attention. Certain material allegations made in the Complaint were not put in 
the Findings of Fact and deemed to be true. We believe this to be error. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
II. CAN THERE BE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR LACK OF GOOD 
FAITH AND FAIR DEALING ON A PART BY A WORKERS 
COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER BY THE INJURED 
WORKER. 
In Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985) the 
Court determined that there was an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing 
between an insurer and insured, based on a contract theory. 
Article 11 of the Utah Constitution provides that all persons shall have a 
remedy at law in a civil action. If this Court were to rule that a claimant in a 
workers compensation claim could not sue the workers compensation 
insurance carrier for bad faith adjusting of a claim, then the claimant would 
be denied a remedy at law. 
In Ammerman v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 430 P.2d 576 (Utah 
1967), the Court held that the insurer controls the payment of the insured's 
medical and other expenses. It further held the insurer must pay covered 
claims and that the insured can sue the insurer. The case, however, was not in 
a workers compensation context, but does show the inclination of our 
Supreme Court. 
Colorado has addressed this issue in Travelers Insurance Co. v. Savio, 
706 P.2d 1258 (Colo. 1985), wherein the Court held, amongst other things, 
that the Legislature established the Workers Compensation Law to establish 
both an exclusive and comprehensive remedy for the injured worker. The 
Court said: 
"The exclusive liability section applies only to injuries and 
parties covered by the act. Conversely, if either the injury or a 
party status falls outside the ambit of the act, then the liability 
and exclusive provisions of the act are inapplicable . . . The act 
contains no provision indicating that claims against employer or 
insurer for bad faith in handling a claim for compensation or 
treatment are covered by its provision, nor does the act suggest 
any limitation on the potential remedies available for such 
conduct . . . (1264) . . . It follows inevitably from these 
premises that an order securing benefits does not and cannot 
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remedy separate injuries caused by a prior bad faith delay or 
denial of benefits." (1268) (emphasis added) 
In a more recent case the Colorado Supreme Court said in Scott Wetzel 
Services v. Johnson. 821 R2d 804 (Colo. 1991), the Court extended the reach 
of a good faith action by determining that: 
"We hold that an independent claims adjusting company such as 
Wetzel, acting on behalf of a self-insured employer owes a duty 
of good faith and fair dealing to an insured employee in 
investigating and processing a workers compensation claim, 
even in the absence of contractual privity with the employee." 
(813) (emphasis added) 
In Horton v. Gem State Mutual of Utah. 794 P.2d 847 (Utah Ca. 1990) 
held that the insurance carrier acted in bad faith in denying payments on a 
health insurance policy. The law in Utah is clear that a bad faith claim can be 
asserted against an insurance carrier. 
Since there is not the privity of contract as normally seen in an insurer 
and insured relationship the question remains whether in Utah an action for 
bad faith against a workers compensation insurance carrier would sound in 
tort or contract. 
Recently the Nevada Supreme Court in Falline v. GNLV Corp., 823 
P.2d 888 (Nev. 1991) held that there was a common law cause of action 
against a workers compensation insurance carrier by the injured worker. It 
did not define whether it was in tort or contract. Further, both the Seventh 
and Eighth Circuits have held that such action can be maintained in West v. 
Western Casualty & Surety Co.. 846 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1988) and Holman v. 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.. 7112 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1983). Other states 
have reached the same conclusion, Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance 
v. Holland, 469 S.2d 55 (Miss. 1985); Neighbors v. Travelers Insurance Co.. 
551 S.2d 308 (Ala. 1989); Carpentino v. Transport Insurance Co.. 609 Fed. 
Supp. 556 (D. Conn. 1985); Jones v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 474 
N.W.2d 18 (Minn. App. 1991); Anderson v. Continental Insurance Co., 271 
N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978); Coleman v. American Universal Insurance Co.. 273 
N.W.2d 220 (Wis. 1979). This list of cases is not exhaustive. 
Interestingly, in the state of Ohio in Formoso v. Plain Dealer. 480 
N.E.2d 426 (Ohio 1985) an injured worker of a self-insured employer can 
maintain a tort action against his employer for the intentional and wrongful 
termination of workers compensation benefits. 
Colorado provided for a tort action against the workers compensation 
insurance carrier in Travelers Insurance Co. v. Savio, supra. Alabama allows 
for a "tort of outrage" in a bad faith action against a workers compensation 
insurance carrier. See Neighbors v. Travelers Insurance Co., 551 S.2d 308 
(Ala. 1989). 
In Beck v. Farmers Insurance, supra, the Court reasoned: 
"An insured who has suffered a loss and is pressed financially is 
at a marked disadvantage when bargaining with the insurer over 
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payment for that loss . . . The temptation for an insurer to delay 
settlement while pressures build on the insured is great." (798) 
The Beck court, supra, also recognized: 
'That a majority of states permitted insured to institute a tort 
action against an insurer who fails to bargain in good faith in a 
'first party' situation . . . " (798) 
The Beck court, supra, then went on to conclude that the "tort approach 
adopted by these courts is without a sound theoretical foundation" and thus 
concluded that the matter sounded in contract. 
The Beck court, supra, continued: 
"However, in Lyon v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co., we 
held that a tort cause of action did not arise in a first-party 
insurance contract situation because the relationship between the 
insurer and its insured is fundamentally different than in a third-
party context:.. .The distinction is of no small consequence, in a 
third-party situation, the insurer controls the disposition of 
claims against its insured . . . " 
Is a cause of action by an injured worker against the workers 
compensation insurance Company more like a first-party case than a third-
party case? If it is more like a third-party case, then that court seems to be 
saying those cases should be sounded in tort rather than contract. The Beck 
court, supra, analyzed: 
"In the first-party situation, on the other hand, the reasons for 
finding a fiduciary relationship and imposing a corresponding 
duty are absent. No relationship of trust and reliance is created 
by the contract; it simply obligates the insured to pay claims 
submitted by the insured in accordance with the contract." 
(800) 
The Beck case, supra, then concluded: 
"We therefore hold in a first-party relationship between insurer 
and its insured, the duties and obligations of the parties are 
contractual rather than fiduciary. However, in a footnote 3 
(800) the Court said 'We recognize that in some cases the acts 
constituting a breach of contract may also result in breaches of 
duty that are independent of the contract and may give rise to 
causes of action in tort . . . Thus, intentional and outrageous 
conduct by an insurer against an insured, coupled with the 
failure to bargain, could conceivably result in a tort liability 
independent of (and concurrent with) liability for breach of 
contract.'" (emphasis added) 
From the Beck, supra, analysis it could be reasoned that the case is 
more like a third-party case and a lack of good faith and fair dealing claim 
could sound in tort rather than contract. The Beck court seems to focus 
primarily on the contractual relationship in a first-party insurance situation. 
Appellant contends that a workers compensation insurance carrier does 
not have the discretion to act in bad faith and that a common-law negligence 
action should be able to be maintained against them for their failure to act in 
good faith. 
Theoretically, workers compensation insurance is to protect the 
employer. There is a statutory requirement, however, for the employer to 
have such insurance which makes workers compensation insurance unique. In 
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a third-party situation, like this case, a fiduciary duty exists which places an 
affirmative duty on the insured to investigate the claim and take other action 
necessary to care for the injuries of the insured. This is not an arms-length 
relationship between the injured worker and the workers compensation 
carrier as in a first-party contract. Therefore, the justification for adopting a 
cause of action is premised upon the inherently unequal bargaining power 
between the insurer and the insured worker, which persists throughout the 
parties' relationships and becomes particularly acute when the insured worker 
sustains a physical injury and economic loss for which coverage is sought. See 
Anderson v. Continental Insurance Co., 271 N.W.2d 377 and Dolan v. A.I.D. 
Insurance Co., 431 N.W.2d 794. 
The issue of the Workers Compensation Act being the exclusive 
remedy is not therefore relevant in Utah in light of 31(a)-22-1004 Utah Code 
Annotated, heretofore cited, that allows an injured worker to sue the workers 
compensation insurer. Thus, the Workers Compensation Act cannot be the 
exclusive remedy if there is this other remedy provided by statute. If there is 
such a remedy provided by statute, then it must sound either in tort or 
contract. 
Appellant urges this Court to allow a direct suit in tort by the injured 
worker against the workers compensation insurance carrier. 
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III. MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT SHOULD 
BE SET FORTH IN THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND DEEMED 
TO TRUE FOR THE PURPOSE OF A MOTION TO DISMISS. 
In a Motion to Dismiss, all the material allegations alleged by the 
Complaint are deemed as true. It must clearly appear on the record that the 
Trial Court considered all the material allegations of the plaintiff and deemed 
them to true. In order to do this it would appear that the Court must include 
those material allegations in the Findings of Fact prior to entering the Court's 
Conclusions of Law. If the Trial Court does not set all of the allegations out in 
the Findings of Fact, then how would the Appellate Court know whether the 
Trial Court considered them. (See Coleman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 
P.2d 627 (Utah 1990)). 
The following material allegations were omitted from the Findings of 
Fact even after plaintiff filed a Motion to Reconsider, to the Trial Court: 
"In addition, three physicians recommended Savage have 
a dorsal column stimulator treatment since she was still 
suffering from extreme lower back pain some time after the 
accident and her operation. 
Educators was aware that Gerald Moress, M.D., would 
provide a conservative medical opinion and there was a strong 
likelihood that his opinion would be favorable to Savage despite 
the validity of Savage's claim and significant and substantial 
contrary medical evidence. 
The defendants, Educators, without justification, 
terminated plaintiffs benefits and refused to pay for a dorsal 
column stimulator. 
During the time Educators terminated Savage's benefits 
and medical treatment, Savage suffered from extreme physical 
and emotional distress and pain as a result of not being able to 
receive proper medical care. 
Educators engaged in a tortious course of conduct 
wherein they used Dr. Moress, knowing that his opinions 
favored the insurance company rather than being fair, balanced, 
medically sound, and accurate. 
At all material times, there existed a fiduciary 
relationship between defendant and plaintiff in handling 
plaintiffs claim and that the defendant had breached its 
fiduciary duty to the plaintiff. 
In a Motion to Dismiss, all the material allegations alleged by the 
Complaint are deemed as true. It must clearly appear to the trial court that the 
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of plaintiffs claim. Therefore, 
all allegations of the First Amended Complaint should be set forth in the 
Findings of Fact. See Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P2 622 (Utah 
1990)" 
IV. ARE PUNITIVE DAMAGES RECOVERABLE IN A BAD 
FAITH CLAIM AGAINST A WORKERS COMPENSATION 
INSURANCE CARRIER BY AN INJURED WORKER? 
It would not appear that this issue could be resolved or argued until 
such time as this Court determines whether there can be such a claim and if 
there is, whether it sounds in tort or contract. Therefore, the appellant does 
not address this issue until further ruling of this Court. 
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V. THERE HAS BEEN NO EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON THE 
ISSUE OF THE COMPETENCY OF DR. GERALD MORESS 
AND THE BIAS OF USING HIM FOR AN INDEPENDENT 
MEDICAL EXAMINATION. 
It would appear that this issue could not be properly addressed without 
further discovery and without factual determination by the trier of fact. 
Therefore, the appellant does not address this issue in this Brief. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing arguments and the relevant 
case and statutory law, Savage respectfully requests this Court to reverse the 
lower court's granting of the Motion to Dismiss and to rule that there is a 
cause of action in the state of Utah by an injured worker against the workers 
compensation insurance carrier of his employer for lack of good faith and 
fair dealing in processing his claims sounding in tort. 
To rule that the failure of the Trial Court to include all the material 
allegations of the Plaintiffs Complaint in the Findings of Fact and deem each 
such allegation to be true is reversible error. 
To determine that punitive damages are available to an injured worker 
against a workers compensation insurance carrier for lack of good faith and 
fair dealing in adjusting a claim. 
17 
For this Court to reverse the lower court's granting of the Motion to 
Dismiss and to order the case to proceed to trial. 
DATED this lb day of January, 1993. 
John/rreston Creer 
)rney for the Plaintiff/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF 
OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT PAT CHRISTINE SAVAGE was mailed, 
postage prepaid, this /% day of January, 1993, to the following: 
Samuel D. McVey 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
C M No. 920901786 
Judge Leslie A Lewis 
This matter comes before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendant. 
Plaintiff Christine Savage filed the original complaint in this matter, after which defendant 
Educator's Insurance Company filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. In response, 
Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint, which defendant then included in its motion 
to dismiss. The First Amended Complaint alleged breach of contract as the first cause of 
action, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing as the second cause of action, 
00013J 
intentional infliction of severe emotional distress as the third cause of action, tortious or 
bad faith conduct in dealing with plaintiff in the second, third and fourth causes of action, 
breach of fiduciary relationship in the fifth cause of action, and interference with a 
protected property interest in the sixth cause of action. Plaintiff also alleged entitlement 
to punitive damages. 
The Court has received the defendant's motion to dismiss and memorandum in 
support thereof. The Court has also received the plaintiffs memorandum in opposition 
and defendant's reply to plaintiffs memorandum. The matter was submitted for decision 
and was argued before the Court on July 17, 1992. Plaintiff was represented by her 
attorney, John Preston Creer. Defendant was represented by its attorney, Samuel D. 
McVey. The Court has now reviewed the defendant's motion to dismiss and the 
memoranda filed by both parties and has carefully considered the arguments of counsel. 
Being fully advised, the Court makes the following findings and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS 
In the context of a motion to dismiss, the material allegations of the complaint are 
accepted as true. Colman v. Utah State Land Board. 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990). The 
following findings and allegations are taken from the plaintiffs first amended complaint. 
1. Plaintiff was employed by Jordan School District when she sustained personal 
injuries arising out of and in the course of her employment. (First Amended Complaint, 
1M 2, 5, and 6.) 
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2. At the time of plaintiffs injury, defendant was the workers' compensation 
insurance carrier for Jordan School District. Defendant had entered into a contract with 
Jordan School District to provide such insurance. (First Amended Complaint, 1fH 3, 12.) 
3. Plaintiff underwent surgery and treatment for her injuries, but still suffered from 
extreme lower back pain. Three physicians recommended that she have a dorsal column 
stimulator treatment. (First Amended Complaint, 1111 6 and 7.) 
4. Defendant referred plaintiff to Dr. Gerald Moress for an independent medical 
evaluation (hereinafter "IME"). Dr. Moress provided a written opinion that he knew of no 
further medical treatment for the plaintiffs condition. He was also of the opinion that it 
was not likely that a dorsal column stimulator treatment would relieve the plaintiffs pain. 
(First Amended Complaint, 11 8.) 
5. Based on Dr. Moress' opinion, defendant informed plaintiff that no future 
medical expenses would be covered by workers' compensation insurance, including the 
dorsal column stimulator. Defendant did continue to provide coverage for psychiatric care. 
This occurred on March 6, 1991. (First Amended Complaint, 11 9.) 
6. On or about December 2, 1991, defendant entered into a stipulated findings and 
order in case No. B91000577 before the Industrial Commission of Utah which was 
plaintiffs workers' compensation claim arising out of her industrial injury. In the 
stipulation and order, defendant stipulated that it would pay all of plaintiffs medical 
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expenses arising out of her industrial injury, including the dorsal column stimulator 
treatment. (First Amended Complaint, 11 10.) 
7. The workers' compensation insurance contract between defendant and Jordan 
School district required defendant to pay all reasonable and necessary medical expenses 
incurred by plaintiff as the result of accidents or injuries sustained while working for 
Jordan School District. Plaintiff suffered an industrial accident and defendant refused to 
pay for certain medical expenses arising out of the accident. Plaintiff alleges that this 
refusal was a breach of the workers' compensation insurance contract, thus causing damage 
to the plaintiff. (First Amended Complaint, 
1M 14-18.) 
8. Plaintiff alleges that defendant breached a duty of good faith and fair dealing in 
denying plaintiffs request for certain medical benefits under the workers' compensation 
policy. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant acted wrongfully and unreasonably by failing 
and refusing to make an adequate investigation prior to withholding approval for the 
dorsal column stimulator treatment, by refusing to give reasonable interpretation to the 
provisions of the workers' compensation insurance policy, by acting to protect defendant's 
own financial interest at the expense of the plaintiffs rights, by failing to provide plaintiff 
any reasonable or justifiable basis for denying plaintiffs request for a dorsal column 
stimulator and by forcing plaintiff to engage legal counsel and initiate litigation. Plaintiff 
also alleges that defendant breached a duty of good faith and fair dealing by failing to 
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administer plaintiffs claim for workers' compensation benefits in compliance with Utah 
Code Annotated § 31A-26-303(3)(h). (First Amended Complaint, 11 20.) 
9. Plaintiff alleges that defendant intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress on 
the plaintiff by using Dr. Moress' IME report as a basis to terminate plaintiffs workers' 
compensation benefits. Plaintiff alleges that such reliance on Dr. Moress' report was not 
sufficient cause for such termination of benefits. (First Amended Complaint, 11 25.) 
10. Also in support of her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
plaintiff alleges that defendant was aware that Dr. Moress would provide a conservative 
medical opinion and that there was a strong likelihood that his opinion would not be 
favorable to plaintiff. (First Amended Complaint, 11 26.) 
11. Plaintiff alleges that defendant engaged in a tortious course of conduct by using 
Dr. Moress for an IME evaluation, knowing that his opinions favor the insurance company 
rather than being fair, balanced, medically sound and accurate. (First Amended 
Complaint, 1 33.) Plaintiff alleges that the defendants should have known that the plaintiff 
and others similarly situated would be damaged through their use of Dr. Moress as an 
IME physician. (First Amended Complaint, 11 34.) 
12. Plaintiff alleges a breach of a fiduciary relationship between the defendant and 
the plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts that the defendant, by issuing the workers' compensation 
insurance policy to Jordan School District and accepting premiums, agreed and promised 
that if plaintiff incurred covered medical expenses that the duty of the defendant to pay 
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such benefits would arise. Plaintiff alleges that once plaintiff and plaintiffs doctor 
requested a dorsal column stimulator, such request gave rise to a duty to approve the 
requested treatment and pay the benefits associated therewith. After the duty to pay 
benefits arose, plaintiff asserts that such benefits were no longer the property of the 
defendant but were held by the defendant for the sole benefit and use of the plaintiff, 
thereby creating a fiduciary relationship between defendant and plaintiff. Plaintiff claims 
that this duty was breached when the medical treatment was not approved. (First 
Amended Complaint, 1111 39-42.) 
13. Plaintiff alleges that defendant knew that plaintiff was relying on the financial 
assistance from the benefits provided under the workers' compensation insurance policy 
and that plaintiff had a protected property interest in such benefits. Plaintiff alleges that 
defendant intentionally and willfully interfered with this protected property interest in 
denying plaintiff the opportunity to have the dorsal column stimulator treatment. (First 
Amended Complaint, 1f 44.) 
14. Plaintiff also alleged throughout the complaint that defendant's conduct was 
willful, malicious, knowing, and reckless, thus entitling plaintiff to punitive damages-
CONCLUSTONS OF LAW 
Plaintiffs first cause of action alleges that defendant entered a contract with 
plaintiffs former employer Jordan School District (the "District") to provide workers' 
compensation benefits including reasonable and necessary medical expenses arising out of 
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industrial accidents. Plaintiff alleges that defendant breached that contract by not 
providing certain medical benefits she requested. The determination of whether medical 
treatment is reasonable and necessary is one to be made exclusively by the Industrial 
Commission pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section 35-1-60. This section provides that the 
workers' compensation remedy is the exclusive remedy for employees injured in the course 
of their employment. 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of this 
Title for injuries sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, 
shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer and . . . the liabilities of 
the employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any and all other civil 
liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to such employee . . . and 
no action at law may be maintained against an employer, or against any 
officer, agent or employee of the employer based upon any accident, injury 
or death of an employee. 
The Workmen's Compensation Act provides specific procedures to follow in the 
event an employee is dissatisfied with medical benefits provided by the insurance carrier. 
The proper course is to file an appUcation for hearing with the Industrial Commission or 
request other Industrial Commission review. It is not proper to seek review of such 
matters in District Court. Plaintiff has alleged in this cause of action that she was not 
provided with medical benefits which were reasonable and necessary. That determination 
must be addressed by the Industrial Commission, and not by this Court. Therefore, the 
plaintiffs first cause of action for breach of contract is dismissed with prejudice. 
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Plaintiffs second cause of action alleges that defendant breached a covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing owed to plaintiff. Plaintiff has also alleged tortious or bad faith 
conduct in defendant's dealing with plaintiff in her second, third and fourth causes of 
action. The Utah courts have made it clear that only an insured can bring an action of 
bad faith or wrongful denial against its insurer. In Pixton v. State Faim 809 P.2d 746 
(Utah App. 1991), the Utah Court of Appeals addressed the specific issue of whether a 
beneficiary of an insurance policy can bring an action against the insurer for breach of a 
duty to deal fairly and in good faith. The Court found that the Utah Supreme Court's 
prior decisions in the area of insurance carrier liability indicated that there was no cause 
of action for bad faith or wrongful denial of benefits by a beneficiary against an insurer. 
In sum, we a persuaded that there is no duty of good faith and fair 
dealing imposed upon an insurer running to a third party claimant, such as 
Pixton, seeking to recover against the company's insured. This conclusion is 
consistent with the commentators and the great majority of courts in other 
jurisdictions that have been confronted with the issue. As one well known 
commentator on insurance law noted, "the duty to exercise due care or good 
faith is owed to the insured and not to a third party." 14G Couch on 
Insurance section 51:136 (Rev. 2d Ed. 1982). 
The majority of courts faced with the potential existence of a duty of 
good faith and fair dealing running from an insurance company to a third 
party claimant seeking to recover against the company's insured have rejected 
such a notion. 
809 P.2d at 749-750. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has also indicated that no bad faith action can be 
brought where there is no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant 
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insurer. Auerbach Company v. Key Security Policy. Inc., 680 P.2d 740 (Utah 1984). A 
contract of insurance is between the insurer and the insured, not the insurer and a third 
party claimant. 
Plaintiff has alleged in her amended complaint that she is a beneficiary to a 
contract of insurance between defendant and Jordan School District. She has alleged that 
the insurance contract was between defendant and the District. The Plaintiff in this action 
is a third party, and is not a party to the contract of insurance between defendant and the 
District. She is therefore not entitled to raise claims of tortious or bad faith conduct, or 
breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Therefore, the second, third and fourth 
causes of action are dismissed with prejudice. 
Plaintiffs third cause of action alleges intentional infliction of severe emotional 
distress because the defendant terminated medical benefits based on an independent 
medical examination report of Dr. Gerald Moress. Plaintiff alleges that defendant sent 
plaintiff to Dr. Moress for the examination, and that defendant knew that Dr. Moress 
would provide a conservative medical opinion and that there was a strong likelihood that 
his opinion would not be favorable to plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that defendant's reliance 
on Dr. Moress' report in terminating benefits was intentional, unjustified, and caused her 
severe emotional distress. 
It is proper and indicative of good faith conduct for an insurer to rely on an 
expert's opinion in administering a claim or in defending an uncertain claim. The Court of 
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Appeals has held that an insurer is entitled to rely on an expert's opinion. Callioux v. 
Progressive Ins. Co.. 745 P.2d 838 (Utah App. 1987). Moreover, an insurer is permitted to 
assert its rights to defend against uncertain claims. 
Undoubtedly an insurance company is privileged, in pursuing its own 
economic interests, to assert in a permissible way its legal rights and to 
communicate its position in good faith to its insured even though it is 
substantially certain that in so doing emotional distress will be caused. (Rest. 
2d Torts, section 468 com. G and illus. 14; cf. Rest. Torts, section 773; and 
see generally Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964), 'Privilege,' pp. 99-100.) 
Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co.. 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Cal. App. 1970). 
Defendant was entitled to assert its legal rights, to defend against uncertain claims and to 
process the plaintiffs claim for additional medical benefits according to the opinion of its 
medical expert. Therefor, plaintiffs third cause of action for intentional infliction of severe 
emotional distress is not viable under these factual allegations, and is legally insufficient. 
The third cause of action is dismissed with prejudice. 
Plaintiff has alleged entitlement to punitive damages. All of plaintiffs claims are in 
contract. Allegations of a breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing are contractual in 
nature. Punitive damages are not recoverable under contract claims. Canyon Country 
Store v. Bracey. 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989). Therefore, plaintiffs claims for punitive 
damages are dismissed with prejudice. 
The fourth cause of action alleges that defendant engaged in a tortious course of 
conduct by using Dr. Gerald Moress for plaintiffs independent medical examination, 
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allegedly knowing that his opinions favor the insurance company rather than being "fair, 
balanced, medically sound and accurate." However, the defendant was entitled by law to 
select any physician it desired to perform an independent medical examination: 
. . . The defendant may also require the applicant to submit to an 
independent medical examination to be conducted by a physician of the 
defendant's choice. Failure of an applicant to comply with such requests may 
result in the dismissal of a claim or a delay in the scheduling of a hearing. 
Utah Admin. Rules, R568-1-4(H), (formerly R490-1-4(H)). The Industrial Commission 
rule specifically provides that the defendant in a workers' compensation action may choose 
any physician to perform an examination. Therefore, the plaintiffs cause of action 
regarding the defendant's selection of a physician to perform an independent medical 
examination is insufficient as a matter of law, and is dismissed with prejudice. 
Plaintiffs fifth cause of action alleges that defendant breached a fiduciary 
relationship with the plaintiff by failing to provide certain medical treatment when the 
treatment was requested by plaintiff. For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs fifth cause 
of action for breach of fiduciary relationship fails, and is dismissed with prejudice. 
Plaintiffs sixth cause of action alleges that defendant interfered with plaintiffs 
protected property interest by denying coverage for certain medical benefits when 
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requested by the plaintiff. For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs sixth cause of action 
for interference with a protected property interest fails, and is dismissed with prejudice. 
Dated this / ^ ( l a y c ^ A u g u s t , 1992. 
Leslie A. Lewis 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 




Samuel D. McVey (A4083) 
Stuart F. Weed (A5557) 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
By 
T:- -. ;-'f»ic«a» District 
AUG 1 4 1992 
Deputy C.erk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 920901786 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Based upon the Findings and Conclusions of Law entered by the Court in this 
matter, it is hereby ORDERED that the plaintiffs First Amended Complaint be and 
hereby is DISMISSED in its entirety, WITH PREJUDICE. 
Dated this / ^ day of August, 1992. 
BY THE/COURT 
Approved as to form: 
Leslie A. Lewis 
District Court Judge 
John Preston Creer 
nnni /i Q 
ADDENDUM "B 
JOHN PRESTON CREER (0573) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 












CIVIL NUMBER: 92-06550235 
JUDGE LESLIE A. LEWIS 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, CHRISTINE SAVAGE, and alleges against 
the Defendant as follows: 
1. Plaintiff, CHRISTINE SAVAGE (hereinafter "SAVAGE") is a 
resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and is over the age of 21 years. 
2. SAVAGE was employed by Jordan School District as a bus driver 
at all time pertinent to this lawsuit. 
3. Defendant, EDUCATORS INSURANCE COMPANY (hereinafter 
"EDUCATORS"), is an insurance company incorporated in the state of Utah 
and doing business in the state of Utah and is the workmans' compensation 
insurance carrier'for the Jordan School District in the State of Utah. 
4. Venue is properly laid in this Salt Lake County, in that all the 
activities which are the subject matter of this lawsuit took place in Salt Lake 
County. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
5. SAVAGE had a head-on collision while driving a Jordan School 
District bus, on January 5,1987. An automobile careened out of control 
during a winter storm and crashed into the school bus driven by SAVAGE. 
6. As a result of that accident, SAVAGE sustained personal injuries 
to her lower back and right hand. She subsequently had a disc removed as a 
result of the accident. 
7. In addition, three physicians recommended that she have a 
dorsal column stimulator treatment, since she was still suffering from 
extreme lower back pain some time after the accident and her operation. 
8. The Defendant, EDUCATORS, referred the Plaintiff to Dr. Gerald 
Moress for an Independent Medical Evaluation (hereinafter "IME"). 
Dr. Moress gave an opinion after this evaluation that he knew of no further 
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treatment for the Plaintiff and that it was not likely that a dorsal column 
stimulator treatment would relieve the Plaintiffs pain. 
9. As a result of that written opinion, on or about March 6, 1991, 
Bobbie Whitlock, an agent for EDUCATORS, sent a letter to SAVAGE, 
informing her that there would no longer be any benefits for future medical 
expenses, including the dorsal column stimulator. They did allow SAVAGE 
to continue to have psychiatric care. 
10. On or about December 2,1991, EDUCATORS, entered into a 
Stipulated Findings and Order, in case number B91000577, before the 
Industrial Commission of Utah, entitled Pat SAVAGE, Applicant, vs. Jordan 
School District (Employer), Educators (Carrier for Employer) and the 
Employers Reinsurance Fund, Defendant. In that Stipulation, Findings and 
Order, entered into on or about December 1,1991, EDUCATORS, by and 
through their counsel, stipulated that they would pay all past, present, and 
future medical expenses of the Plaintiff, for her injuries sustained on January 
5, 1987, plus other benefits which had previously been denied, including the 
dorsal column stimulator. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract) 
11. The Plaintiff adopts the allegations contained in 1 through 10 as 
if fully set forth herein. 
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12. The Defendant, EDUCATORS, entered into a contract with the 
Tordan School District to provide workmans compensation insurance 
coverage for the Plaintiff. 
13- That contract required EDUCATORS, to pay all reasonable and 
necessary medical expenses incurred by the Plaintiff in any accident or injury 
incurred while she was working for the Jordan School District. 
14. Plaintiff suffered an accident and was injured, but the Defendant, 
EDUCATORS, refused to pay all her medical expenses, absent a reasonable 
basis for denial of policy benefits, thus breaching their contract. 
15. The Defendant, EDUCATORS, has breached its contract by failing 
to pay the policy benefits to the Plaintiff at the time and in the manner that 
Plaintiff was entitled with a reckless disregard of a reasonable basis for denial, 
despite the validity of the claim. 
16. As a result of the contractual breach, Plaintiff has incurred 
damages due Plaintiff under the terms of the insurance policy in an amount 
to be proven at the time of trial. 
17. As a result of said contractual breach, Plaintiff has suffered 
foreseeable consequential damages in an amount to be proven at the time of 
trial. 
18. As a result of said contractual breach, Plaintiff has suffered 
general damages, including mental, emotional, and physical suffering which 
will be proven at the time of trial. 
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing) 
19. The Plaintiff adopted the allegations contained in 1 through 18 
as if fully set forth herein. 
20. At all material times, Defendant, knowing that Plaintiffs claim 
is wholly valid and should be paid was wrongfully and in breached of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing withheld and denied certain 
benefits to Plaintiff. In denying the claim for certain benefits, Defendant has 
acted wrongfully and unreasonably in the following respects, among others: 
a. Defendant failed and refused to make an adequate 
investigation before withholding benefits of a dorsal column stimulator due 
under the policy. 
b. Defendant refused to give any reasonable interpretation to 
the provision of the policy insurance or any reasonable application of such 
provisions to Plaintiffs claim and has acted to protect its own financial 
interest at the expense of the Plaintiffs rights. 
c. Defendant has failed to provide Plaintiff any reasonable or 
justifiable bases for denying Plaintiffs claim for a dorsal column stimulator in 
relation to the insurance policy, the facts, or applicable law. 
d. Defendant's refusal to pay benefits due impel Plaintiff to 
engage legal counsel and to initiate litigation to recover for the pain and 
suffering as a result of the denial of such benefits. Defendant has failed to 
handle Plaintiffs claim for benefits in compliance with the minimum 
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standard of conduct set forth by the State of Utah in the Claims Practices Act 
31A-26-303(3)(h) Utah Code Annotated. 
21. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of Defendant, 
Plaintiff was substantial compensable loses, including benefits withheld, and 
economic losses, such as attorney's fees, loss of credit, interest on borrowed 
money, travel and other incidental expenses and has suffered physical and 
severe mental and emotional distress and discomfort, all to Plaintiffs 
detriment and damage in amounts not fully ascertained but within the 
jurisdiction of this Court. 
22. At all material times doing things alleged herein, the Defendant 
acted fraudulently, oppressively, maliciously and outrageously toward 
Plaintiff, with conscious disregard to Plaintiffs known rights and with the 
intention of causing or willfully disregarding the probability of causing, 
unjust and cruel pain and hardship to Plaintiff. In so acting, Defendant 
intended to and did vex, injure and annoy Plaintiff. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Intentional Infliction of Severe Emotional Distress) 
23. The Plaintiff adopts the allegations contained in 1 through 22 as 
if fully set forth herein. 
24. At all times relevant herein the Defendant acted by and through 
their agents, officers and employees, each of whom was acting within the 
purpose and scope of his or her agency or employment. 
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25. The Defendant, through their agents, officers and employees, 
intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress upon the Plaintiff, by 
amongst other things, using Dr. Gerald Moress' report of his independent 
medical examination, to terminate the benefits for SAVAGE'S workmans' 
compensation without just cause. 
26. EDUCATORS was aware that Gerald Moress, M.D., would 
provide a conservative medical opinion and that there was a strong 
likelihood that his opinion would not be favorable to SAVAGE, despite the 
validity of SAVAGE'S claim and significant and substantial contrary medical 
evidence. 
27. The Defendant, EDUCATORS, without justification, terminated 
Plaintiffs benefits and refused to pay for a dorsal column stimulator. 
28. During the time EDUCATORS terminated SAVAGE'S benefits 
and medical treatment, SAVAGE suffered extreme physical and emotional 
distress and pain as a result of not being able to receive proper medical care. 
29. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants' tortious 
conduct, Plaintiff has incurred special damages in an amount to be proven at 
the time of trial. 
30. As a further direct and proximate result the Plaintiff has 
incurred general damages, including severe mental and emotional anguish, 
physical pain, and loss of enjoyment of life, for which Plaintiff should be 
compensated in an amount to be proven at the time of trial. 
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31. EDUCATORS7 conduct was willful and malicious and/or a 
knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of the 
Defendant, rendering them liable for punitive damages. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Course and Conduct in Dealing by Educators Mutual) 
32. The Plaintiff adopts the allegations contained in 1 through 36 as 
if fully set forth herein. 
33. EDUCATORS engaged in a tortious course of conduct wherein 
they used Dr. Moress, knowing that his opinions favor the insurance 
company rather than being fair, balanced, medically sound, and accurate. 
34. The course and conduct pursued by the Defendant, 
EDUCATORS, was intentional and wrongful and in the normal course of 
conduct the Defendant should have know that the Plaintiff and others 
similarly situated would be damaged thereby and would suffer foreseeable 
consequences, damages, and losses. 
35. As a direct and proximate result of the course of conduct by the 
Defendant, the Plaintiff has incurred special damages in an amount to be 
proven at the time of trial. 
36. As a further and direct proximate result thereof, Plaintiff has 
incurred general damages, including severe mental and emotional anguish, 
physical pain, and loss of enjoyment for life which will be proven at the time 
of trial. 
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37. The intentional conduct of the Plaintiff was willful and 
malicious and/or a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard 
of, the rights of the Defendant, rendering the Defendant liable for punitive 
damages. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Fiduciary Relationship) 
38. The Plaintiff adopts the allegations contained in 1 through 38 as 
is fully set forth herein. 
39. The Defendant by issuing the insurance policy to Jordan School 
District and accepting premiums, agreed and promised that if Plaintiff 
incurred covered medical expenses that the duty of the Defendant paid 
benefits therefore would arise. 
40. Plaintiff and Plaintiffs doctor sought for the Plaintiff to have a 
dorsal column stimulator to relieve the paid and suffering which claim gave 
rise to the Defendant's duty to approve the dorsal column stimulator 
treatment and pay the benefits herein alleged. After this duty to pay benefits 
arose, such benefits were no longer the property of the Defendant but were 
held by the Defendant for the sole benefit and use of Plaintiff, thereby creating 
a fiduciary relationship between Defendant and Plaintiff. 
41. At all material times, there existed a fiduciary relationship 
between Defendant and Plaintiff as the insured upon submission the 
Defendant owed a fiduciary duty to accept the treatment and pay for such 
benefits and to act, at all times, with the upmost care and respect in handling 
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such a claim. 
42. Defendant has breached its fiduciary duty to the Plaintiff by the 
acts or omission set forth herein all to Plaintiffs damage as allegeded herein. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Interference with a Protected Property Interest) 
43. The Plaintiff adopts the allegations contained in 1 through 43 as 
fully set forth herein. 
44. At all material time and in doing the things alleged herein, 
Defendant knew the Plaintiff was relying on the financial assistance from the 
benefits as promised in the policy and thus that a protected property interest 
in such benefits. Nevertheless Defendants in each of them intentionally and 
willfully interfered with such protected property interest of Plaintiff and that 
they denied Plaintiff the opportunity to have the dorsal column stimulator 
treatment to relieve the pain and suffering for over a year. 
45. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's tortious conduct 
Plaintiff has incurred special damages in an amount to be proven at the time 
of trial. 
46. As a further direct and proximate result of the Plaintiff toward 
misconduct has incurred general damages and consequential damages 
including severe mental and emotional anguish, physical pain and loss 
enjoyment of life for which Plaintiff should be compensated in an amount to 
be proven at the time of trial. 
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47. EDUCATORS' conduct was willful and malicious and/or having 
a knowing and reckless indifference toward and a disregard of the rights of 
the Defendant. 
48. Plaintiff request a trial by jury. 
WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for a judgment against the Defendant as 
follows: 
1. For an Order to establishing the rights, duties and liabilities to 
the parties under the insurance policy as regard to the dorsal column 
stimulator. 
2- For special and compensatory damages, including special and 
general damages, according to proof. 
3- For an assessment of punitive damages, according to proof. 
4. For attorney's fees, cost of suit and for such other relief as may be 
proper. 
Dated this 1_ .day of May, 1992. 
'Attorney for the Plaintiff, 
CHRISTINE SAVAGE 
Plaintiffs Address: 
6319 West 13400 South 
Herriman, Utah 84065 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
Pat Christine Savage, deposes and says that she is the Plaintiff herein; 
that she has read the above captioned Complaint; knows the contents thereof 
and that the same is true of her own knowledge, except as to matters therein 
alleged upon information and belief and as to those matters believes them to 
be true. 
{-^U<aJ£*is ^^K4i 'C<C^. 
Christine Savage 
1992. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this y^C day of V ^ 7 ^ . / , 
O 
Notary Public 
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